In military recovery and logistics, few subjects spark more debate than the balance between safety and operational freedom. The Special Types General Order (STGO) regulations were created to protect the public and infrastructure when abnormal loads move on civilian roads. They set out clear limits for axle weights, escort requirements and notification periods, ensuring that large or heavy vehicles can operate safely on public highways.
For civilian haulage this system works well. But for the armed forces, whose vehicles often move under urgent conditions and whose equipment is far heavier than standard road vehicles, the same rules can become an obstacle. The reality is that while STGO exists for good reason, it was never designed with military recovery in mind. Just because the vehicles are painted green does not make them exempt from the laws of physics or safety, yet the way the regulations are applied can slow down or restrict exercises when time is critical.
Joe Whittaker, Programme Manager at EKA, says this balance is central to the discussion. “We fully support the intent of STGO. These regulations exist to prevent bridge failures, road damage and unsafe loads. But in military recovery, there are moments when the operational need to move quickly cannot align with civilian notice periods. The challenge is to respect both safety and practicality.”
Understanding STGO and its purpose:
STGO regulations divide abnormal loads into categories based on weight and axle configuration. Category 1 covers smaller heavy loads up to 50 tonnes, Category 2 extends to 80 tonnes, and Category 3 up to 150 tonnes. Each category sets limits for axle weights and requires specific notice to highway and bridge authorities, ranging from two to five working days. The heavier the vehicle or load, the more notice and escort support is required.
This system ensures that bridges are not overstressed and that road safety is maintained. It is essential for public protection and infrastructure management. However, its application to military recovery creates a practical challenge. The timeframes and escort requirements that make sense for civilian hauliers often conflict with the need for immediate recovery or redeployment of armoured vehicles in a military environment.
Michael Keech, Managing Director of EKA, notes that the problem is not with regulation itself but with how it fits the context. “The STGO framework is built on logic and safety. What it does not currently recognise is the operational urgency of defence. Military recovery can be reactive, unpredictable and time sensitive. The system was never written with that kind of tempo in mind.”
Why military recovery is different:
A military recovery vehicle operates in conditions civilian hauliers rarely face. It must extract damaged or immobilised equipment, often exceeding 40 tonnes, from deep bogs or dense woodland, and then potentially conduct a road move to a backloading point, all within tight timeframes. Recovery tasks aren’t scheduled weeks ahead; they’re dictated by operational urgency.
These vehicles also differ in design. They often have heavier hook weights; much larger wheels fitted with off road tyres and non-standard axle configurations. To lift or suspend tow a casualty vehicle, the recovery system may need to raise the front or rear of the load much higher than a civilian recovery truck would. This shifts weight distribution and increases axle loadings, which can move the recovery vehicle into a higher STGO category even when the total weight has not changed.
Joe explains that this is not about disregarding safety but about acknowledging reality. “The physics of recovery are different when you are lifting a 42-tonne casualty. The vehicle must be designed to cope with that, but the law still measures it by the same standards as a commercial recovery truck. The result is a mismatch between how the system sees the risk and how the task is actually managed.”
The hook weight problem:
To see the issue clearly, consider a recovery vehicle towing a 42-tonne four axle casualty. The act of lifting the casualty’s front axle transfers roughly 14 tonnes of weight onto the recovery vehicle’s rear axles. This means around 28 tonnes are carried over the rear two axles. That figure pushes the recovery vehicle into STGO Category 3, which requires a five-day notification period and an escort.
In military operations that level of delay is rarely acceptable. The vehicle may need to clear a route, recover equipment or support a convoy within hours, not days. The regulation, while vital for safety, does not account for the time-sensitive nature of military tasks. It leaves planners caught between compliance and operational necessity.
Michael adds, “If a bridge authority needs five days’ notice before a movement, that works for civilian transport planning. But for a recovery team that needs to extract an armoured vehicle from a live exercise route, the clock is ticking. The operational need does not pause while paperwork catches up.”
Matt Evans, EKA’s Engineering Director continued “STGO axle-weight requirements provide important guidelines, but they also define the limits of our early concepts. As a result, a vehicle can be optimised for STGO compliance or for maximum recovery performance, though achieving both simultaneously is challenging.”
Workarounds and their consequences:
Joe comments, “The military will always favour low-loading heavy vehicles where possible, it’s safer and reduces drivetrain wear. But there must still be the flexibility to recover vehicles by suspend-tow when the situation demands it.”
Towards clearer guidance:
The answer is not to weaken safety standards but to bring clarity to how they are applied. EKA suggests that clearer, tailored guidance for military recovery operations could resolve much of the current ambiguity. This could include exemptions under certain conditions, simplified notification procedures or updated thresholds that recognise the unique axle dynamics of recovery vehicles.
Such measures would ensure that operations remain safe while allowing military logistics teams to respond at the speed their roles demand. The goal is to align regulation with reality rather than to work around it.
Michael summarises, “Reform should not be about bending the rules but about improving them. A system that reflects how recovery really works will protect both the public and the people doing the job.”
Conclusion:
STGO regulation remains vital for road safety, yet its rigid structure can create real-world problems for military logistics and recovery. With clearer guidance, better-defined exemptions and closer collaboration between regulators, the MOD and industry, it should be possible to maintain safety standards without undermining operational readiness.
Military vehicles may be designed for strength and resilience, but they are not exempt from the same physical and legal constraints as any other. The answer lies not in bypassing regulation but in refining it to reflect the reality of modern defence logistics.
